词汇解析

本期原版的书文选自The Economist 201六-10-0一的Leaders板块小说Why they’re
wrong,释义来自威斯康星Madison分校高阶七版、德克萨斯奥斯汀分校高阶学习词典英汉双解第二版、贰一世纪大英汉词典、元照英美法词典等能源。假如您也在就学The
Economist,欢迎订阅笔者的文集The
Economist
,壹起上学沟通。英文修习者能够因而学习文中词汇,然后将商论的法定译文回译成英文,再对照英文原稿实行相比较,找出异样,以此升高协调的英文水准。

Economics of the populist backlash

In September 1843 the Liverpool Mercury reported on a large free-trade
rally in the city. The Royal Amphitheatre was overflowing【1】.
John Bright, a newly elected MP, spoke eloquently【2】 on the
merits of abolishing duties on imported food, echoing arguments made
in The Economist, a fledgling【3】 newspaper. Mr Bright told his
audience that when canvassing【4】, he had explained “how
stonemasons, shoemakers, carpenters and every kind of artisan suffered
if the trade of the country was restricted.” His speech in Liverpool
was roundly cheered【5】.

Dani Rodrik

【1】overflow本义是溢出、漫出;overflow (with sth) 挤满了人

Populism appears to be a recent phenomenon, but it has been on the rise
for quite some time (Figure 1). Despite recent setbacks in the polls in
the Netherlands and France, it is doubtful that populism will be going
away. The world’s economic-political order appears to be at an
inflection point, with its future direction hanging very much in
balance.

【二】eloquent 雄辩的,有口才的,传神的;副词eloquently;名词eloquence

Figure 1 The global rise of populism

【叁】fledgling新生的;fledged 羽翼已丰的;fully-fledged
成熟的,完全合格的

图片 1

【肆】canvass (sb) (for sth) 游说,拉选票;to carry out a
canvass(名词); canvasser游说者,(选举中)监督投票的人

Notes: See Rodrik (2017) for sources and methods.

【5】roundly cheered 赢得满堂喝彩;roundly 有力地,广泛地

‘Populism’ is a loose label that encompasses a diverse set of movements.
The term originates from the late 19th century, when a coalition of
farmers, workers, and miners in the US rallied against the Gold Standard
and the Northeastern banking and finance establishment. Latin America
has a long tradition of populism going back to the 1930s, and
exemplified by Peronism. Today populism spans a wide gamut of political
movements, including anti-euro and anti-immigrant parties in Europe,
Syriza and Podemos in Greece and Spain, Trump’s anti-trade nativism in
the US, the economic populism of Chavez in Latin America, and many
others in between. What all these share is an anti-establishment
orientation, a claim to speak for the people against the elites,
opposition to liberal economics and globalisation, and often (but not
always) a penchant for authoritarian governance.

It is hard to imagine, 173 years later, a leading Western politician
being lauded for a defence of free trade. Neither candidate in
America’s presidential election is a champion【6】. Donald
Trump, incoherent on so many fronts, is clear in this area: unfair
competition from foreigners has destroyed jobs at home. He threatens
to dismantle【7】 the North American Free Trade Agreement,
withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and start a trade
war with China. To her discredit【8】, Hillary Clinton now
denounces the TPP, a pact she helped negotiate. In Germany, one of the
world’s biggest exporters, tens of thousands took to the streets
earlier this month to march against a proposed trade deal between the
European Union and the United States (see article).

The populist backlash may have been a surprise to many, but it really
should not have been in light of economic history and economic theory.

【6】champion 捍卫者,拥护者

Take history first. The first era of globalisation under the Gold
Standard produced the first self-conscious populist movement in history,
as noted above. In trade, finance, and immigration, political backlash
was not late in coming. The decline in world agricultural prices in
1870s and 1880s produced pressure for resumption in import protection.
With the exception of Britain, nearly all European countries raised
agricultural tariffs towards the end of the 19th century. Immigration
limits also began to appear in the late 19th century. The United States
Congress passed in 1882 the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act that
restricted Chinese immigration specifically. Japanese immigration was
restricted in 1907. And the Gold Standard aroused farmers’ ire because
it was seen to produce tight credit conditions and a deflationary effect
on agricultural prices. In a speech at the Democratic national
convention of 1896, the populist firebrand William Jennings Bryan
uttered the famous words: “You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of
gold.”

【7】dismantle 本义是拆开,引申义为撤消,撤消

To anyone familiar with the basic economics of trade and financial
integration, the politically contentious nature of globalisation should
not be a surprise. The workhorse models with which international
economists work tend to have strong redistributive implications. One of
the most remarkable theorems in economics is the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, which generates very sharp distributional implications from
opening up to trade. Specifically, in a model with two goods and two
factors of production, with full inter-sectoral mobility of the factors,
owners of one of the two factors are made necessarily worse off with the
opening to trade. The factor which is used intensively in the importable
good must experience a decline in its real earnings.

【8】to sb’s discredit 使某人名誉扫地

The Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes very specific conditions. But
there is one Stolper-Samuelson-like result that is extremely general,
and which can be stated as follows. Under competitive conditions, as
long as the importable good(s) continue to be produced at home – that
is, ruling out complete specialisation – there is always at least one
factor of production that is rendered worse off by the liberalisation of
trade. In other words, trade generically produces losers. Redistribution
is the flip side of the gains from trade; no pain, no gain.

The backlash against trade is just one symptom of a pervasive anxiety
about the effects of open economies. Britain’s Brexit vote reflected
concerns about the impact of unfettered migration on public services,
jobs and culture. Big businesses are slammed for using foreign
boltholes【9】 to dodge taxes. Such critiques contain some
truth: more must be done to help those who lose out【10】 from
openness. But there is a world of difference between improving
globalisation and reversing it. The idea that globalisation is a scam
that benefits only corporations and the rich could scarcely be more
wrong.

Economic theory has an additional implication, which is less well
recognised. In relative terms, the redistributive effects of
liberalisation get larger and tend to swamp the net gains as the trade
barriers in question become smaller. The ratio of redistribution to net
gains rises as trade liberalisation tackles progressively lower
barriers.

【玖】bolthole躲避处;bolt是螺栓的意趣,bolthole是螺栓孔,那里是引申义;bolthole
to dodge taxes 逃避缴税天堂(跟The Economist 二〇一六-九-1七的Leaders板块小说A
giant problem中的tax heaven意思周边)

The logic is simple. Consider the denominator of this ratio first. It is
a standard result in public finance that the efficiency cost of a tax
increases with the square of the tax rate. Since an import tariff is a
tax on imports, the same convexity applies to tariffs as well. Small
tariffs have very small distorting effects; large tariffs have very
large negative effects. Correspondingly, the efficiency gains of trade
liberalisation become progressively smaller as the barriers get lower.
The redistributive effects, on the other hand, are roughly linear with
respect to price changes and are invariant, at the margin, to the
magnitude of the barriers. Putting these two facts together, we have the
result just stated, namely that the losses incurred by adversely
affected groups per dollar of efficiency gain are higher the lower the
barrier that is removed.

【10】lose out 丧失,得不到

Evidence is in line with these theoretical expectations. For example, in
the case of NAFTA, Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) have found very large
adverse effects for an “important minority” of US workers, while
Caliendo and Parro (2015) estimate that the overall gains to the US
economy from the agreement were minute (a “welfare” gain of 0.08%).

The real pro-poor policy

Exhibit A【11】 is the vast improvement in global living
standards in the decades after the second world war, which was
underpinned by an explosion in world trade. Exports of goods rose from
8% of world GDP in 1950 to almost 20% a half-century later. Export-led
growth and foreign investment have dragged hundreds of millions out of
poverty in China, and transformed economies from Ireland to South
Korea.

In principle, the gains from trade can be redistributed to compensate
the losers and ensure no identifiable group is left behind. Trade
openness has been greatly facilitated in Europe by the creation of
welfare states. But the US, which became a truly open economy relatively
late, did not move in the same direction. This may account for why
imports from specific trade partners such as China or Mexico are so much
more contentious in the US.

【1一】Exhibit A 首要证据

Economists understand that trade causes job displacement and income
losses for some groups. But they have a harder time making sense of why
trade gets picked on so much by populists both on the right and the
left. After all, imports are only one source of churn in labour markets,
and typically not even the most important source. What is it that
renders trade so much more salient politically? Perhaps trade is a
convenient scapegoat. But there is another, deeper issue that renders
redistribution caused by trade more contentious than other forms of
competition or technological change. Sometimes international trade
involves types of competition that are ruled out at home because they
violate widely held domestic norms or social understandings. When such
“blocked exchanges” (Walzer 1983) are enabled through trade they raise
difficult questions of distributive justice. What arouses popular
opposition is not inequality per se, but perceived unfairness.

Plainly【12】, Western voters are not much comforted by this
extraordinary transformation in the fortunes of emerging markets. But
at home, too, the overall benefits of free trade are
unarguable【13】. Exporting firms are more productive and pay
higher wages than those that serve only the domestic market. Half of
America’s exports go to countries with which it has a free-trade deal,
even though their economies account for less than a tenth of global
GDP.

Financial globalisation is in principle similar to trade insofar as it
generates overall economic benefits. Nevertheless, the economics
profession’s current views on financial globalisation can be best
described as ambivalent. Most of the scepticism is directed at
short-term financial flows, which are associated with financial crises
and other excesses. Long-term flows and direct foreign investment in
particular are generally still viewed favourably. Direct foreign
investment tends to be more stable and growth-promoting. But there is
evidence that it has produced shifts in taxation and bargaining power
that are adverse to labour.

【1二】plainly 直截了本地,坦白地,容易明了地

The boom-and-bust cycle associated with capital inflows has long been
familiar to developing nations. Prior to the Global Crisis, there was a
presumption that such problems were largely the province of poorer
countries. Advanced economies, with their better institutions and
regulation, would be insulated from financial crises induced by
financial globalisation. It did not quite turn out that way. In the US,
the housing bubble, excessive risk-taking, and over-leveraging during
the years leading up to the crisis were amplified by capital inflows
from the rest of the world. In the Eurozone, financial integration, on a
regional scale, played an even larger role. Credit booms fostered by
interest-rate convergence would eventually turn into bust and sustained
economic collapses in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland once credit
dried up in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in the US.

【一三】unarguable 无可置疑的;unarguably 毋庸置疑地

Financial globalisation appears to have produced adverse distributional
impacts within countries as well, in part through its effect on
incidence and severity of financial crises. Most noteworthy is the
recent analysis by Furceri et al. (2017) that looks at 224 episodes of
capital account liberalisation. They find that capital-account
liberalisation leads to statistically significant and long-lasting
declines in the labour share of income and corresponding increases in
the Gini coefficient of income inequality and in the shares of top 1%,
5%, and 10% of income. Further, capital mobility shifts both the tax
burden and the burden of economic shocks onto the immobile factor,
labour.

Protectionism, by contrast, hurts consumers and does little for
workers. The worst-off benefit far more from trade than the rich. A
study of 40 countries found that the richest consumers would lose 28%
of their purchasing power if cross-border trade ended; but those in
the bottom tenth would lose 63%. The annual cost to American consumers
of switching to non-Chinese tyres after Barack Obama slapped
on【14】
anti-dumping tariffs in 2009 was around $1.1 billion,
according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics. That
amounts to over $900,000 for each of the 1,200 jobs that were “saved”.

The populist backlash may have been predictable, but the specific form
it took was less so. Populism comes in different versions. It is useful
to distinguish between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism,
which differ with respect to the societal cleavages that populist
politicians highlight and render salient. The US progressive movement
and most Latin American populism took a left-wing form. Donald Trump and
European populism today represent, with some instructive exceptions, the
right-wing variant (Figure 2). What accounts for the emergence of
right-wing versus left-wing variants of opposition to globalization?

【1肆】slap sth on sth 强制进行

Figure 2 Contrasting patterns of populism in Europe and Latin America

Openness delivers other benefits. Migrants improve not just their own
lives but the economies of host countries: European immigrants who
arrived in Britain since 2000 have been net contributors to the
exchequer【15】, adding more than £20 billion ($34 billion) to
the public finances between 2001 and 2011. Foreign direct investment
delivers competition, technology, management know-how and jobs, which
is why China’s overly cautious moves to encourage FDI disappoint (see
article).

图片 2

【15】exchequer 国库,(英国)财政部

Notes: See Rodrik (2017) for sources and methods.

What have you done for me lately?

None of this is to deny that globalisation has its flaws. Since the
1840s advocates of free trade have known that, though the great
majority benefit, some lose out. Too little has been done to help
these people. Perhaps a fifth of the 6m or so net job losses in
American manufacturing between 1999 and 2011 stemmed from Chinese
competition; many of those who lost jobs did not find new ones. With
hindsight【16】, politicians in Britain were too
blithe【17】 about the pressures that migration from new EU
member states in eastern Europe brought to bear on public services.
And although there are no street protests about the speed and
fickleness【18】 in the tides of short-term capital, its ebb
and flow【19】
across borders have often proved damaging, not least
in the euro zone’s debt-ridden【20】 countries.

I suggest that these different reactions are related to the forms in
which globalisation shocks make themselves felt in society (Rodrik
2017). It is easier for populist politicians to mobilise along
ethno-national/cultural cleavages when the globalisation shock becomes
salient in the form of immigration and refugees. That is largely the
story of advanced countries in Europe. On the other hand, it is easier
to mobilise along income/social class lines when the globalisation shock
takes the form mainly of trade, finance, and foreign investment. That in
turn is the case with southern Europe and Latin America. The US, where
arguably both types of shocks have become highly salient recently, has
produced populists of both stripes (Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump).

【1陆】hindsight 后见之明,事后诸葛孔明

It is important to distinguish between the demand and supply sides of
the rise in populism. The economic anxiety and distributional struggles
exacerbated by globalisation generate a base for populism, but do not
necessarily determine its political orientation. The relative salience
of available cleavages and the narratives provided by populist leaders
are what provides direction and content to the grievances. Overlooking
this distinction can obscure the respective roles of economic and
cultural factors in driving populist politics.

【壹7】blithe 漫不放在心上的

Finally, it is important to emphasise that globalization has not been
the only force at play — nor necessarily even the most important one.
Changes in technology, rise of winner-take-all markets, erosion of
labour market protections, and decline of norms restricting pay
differentials all have played their part. These developments are not
entirely independent from globalisation, insofar as they both fostered
globalization and were reinforced by it. But neither can they be reduced
to it. Nevertheless, economic history and economic theory both give us
strong reasons to believe that advanced stages of globalisation are
prone to populist backlash.

【1八】fickleness 风云突变;fickle 风云突变的

References

【19】ebb and flow起伏消长;ebb 落潮,退潮

Caliendo, L, and F Parro (2015), “Estimates of the Trade and Welfare
Effects of NAFTA,” Review of Economic Studies, 82: 1–44.

【20】debt-ridden债台高筑的;-ridden 充满,充斥

Furceri, D, P Loungani and J D Ostry (2017), “The Aggregate and
Distributional Effects of Financial Globalization,” unpublished paper,
IMF, June.

As our special report this week argues, more must be done to tackle
these downsides. America spends a paltry【21】 0.1% of its GDP,
one-sixth of the rich-country average, on policies to retrain workers
and help them find new jobs. In this context, it is
lamentable【22】 that neither Mr Trump nor Mrs Clinton offers
policies to help those whose jobs have been affected by trade or
cheaper technology. On migration, it makes sense to follow the example
of Denmark and link local-government revenues to the number of
incomers, so that strains on schools, hospitals and housing can be
eased. Many see the rules that bind signatories to trade pacts as an
affront【23】 to democracy. But there are ways that shared rules
can enhance national autonomy. Harmonising norms on how multinational
firms are taxed would give countries greater command over their public
finances. A co-ordinated approach to curbing volatile capital flows
would restore mastery over national monetary policy.

Hakobyan, S, and J McLaren (2016), “Looking for Local Labor Market
Effects of NAFTA,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(4): 728–741.

【贰1】paltry 人微言轻的

Rodrik, D (2017), “Populism and the Economics of Globalization”, CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 12119.

【2二】lamentable 令人遗憾的,令人可惜的;lament 对……表示失望;挽歌,悼词

Walzer, M (1983), Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and
Equality, Martin Robertson: Oxford.

【23】affront 侮辱,冒犯

These are the sensible responses to the peddlers of protectionism and
nativism. The worst answer would be for countries to turn their
backs on
【24】** globalisation. The case for openness remains
much the same as it did when this newspaper was founded to support the
repeal of the Corn Laws【25】. There are more—and more
varied—opportunities in open economies than in closed ones. And, in
general, greater opportunity makes people better off. Since the 1840s,
free-traders have believed that closed economies favour the powerful
and hurt the labouring classes. They were right then. They are right
now.

【24】turn sb’s back on sth 本义是转身背对着,引申为背弃,反对

【二伍】Corn Laws
《谷物法》,对各类谷类进口规定爱慕性关税的法国网球国际比赛,于1八四6年被废止。

【小结】(参考官方译文)

1八肆三年6月的1天,阿布贾皇家剧场挤满了人(overflowing),John•布赖特在台上滔滔不绝地(eloquently)论述打消食物进口关税的累累利益,那与当时新兴的(fledgling)《军事学人》的理念相呼应。他说,在拉票(canvassing)时她说明了壹旦英国的交易受到限制,各行各业的手歌手会遭什么罪,他的解说赢得了满堂喝彩(roundly
cheered)。如今,两位美利坚联邦合众国管辖候选人都不是自由贸易捍卫者(champion)。唐Nader·川普声称要打消(dismantle)北美自由贸易协定。希Larry·Clinton也抨击了她曾救助谈判的跨印度洋伙伴关系协定,这令他声名尽失(to
her
discredit)。人们对开放经济的熏陶充满忧患,而对交易的显明反对(backlash)只是中间四个表象而已。大集团因选拔海外避税天堂(boltholes)逃避税收(dodge
taxes)而遭到抨击。所以必须协助那一个经济开放进程中的输家(those who lose
out from openness)。自由贸易才是当真方便人民群众穷人的国策(pro-poor
policy),其重点证据(Exhibit A)是凭借(underpined
by)全球贸易的爆炸式发展,世界二战后数10年里全世界生活水平获得巨大改进。坦白地说(plainly),新兴市场国家命局爆发了匪夷所思转变,那让西方选民不太舒适。但在国内,自由贸易的完全效果也无须置疑(unarguable)。比较之下,贸易尊崇主义对消费者和工人都无益处。二零零六年前美总统对华夏轮胎强制履行(slapped
on)反销税之后,美利哥买主转而购买非中夏族民共和国产轮胎的费用高得多。贸易开放还会带来别的利益。三千年的话,进入United Kingdom的亚洲陆地移民直接是英帝国国库的净进献者(net
contributors to the
exchequer)。然则,全世界化不无遗憾。从一九玖七到201壹年,米利坚的创建业就业岗位大量压缩,那与中华的竞争有关。事后总的来说(With
hindsight),对于欧洲缔盟东欧新成员国移民给公共服务造成的压力,大不列颠及苏格兰联合王国政客也太淡然置之(blithe)。尽管对于长期资金火速而无常(fickleness)的流淌还没出现街头抗议,但资本的跨境涌入和流出(ebb
and
flow)却不时造成损伤,尤其是在英镑区里那多少个债台高筑(debt-ridden)的国家更是如此。要想缓解这几个题材,还需愈多举措。对于再培养和操练工人、协理失去工作工人再就业的方针下边,美利坚联邦合众国的耗费卑不足道(paltry),仅为其GDP的0.一%。在那种情景下,特朗普和希Larry都未有提议扶助下岗人群的策略,那很可悲(lamentable)。许几个人觉得贸易协定绑定签署国的做法是对民主的加害(affront),但依旧有主意通过共享的平整来深化国家自主权。建立跨国公司征税的调和规范,协同控制资产能够流动,这个都是对交易体贴主义和本土主义鼓吹者的明智回应。最不好的结果是各国转而不予(turn
their backs on)全世界化。本刊初创时支持撤消《谷物法》(the Corn
Laws),近期仍亟需保持开放。与封乳房缺少症济体(closed
economies)相比较,开放经济体(open
economies)会有越来越多机会,让国民走上富足(better
off)之路。1九世纪40年间以来,自由贸易主义者平素相信封乳房结核济体对权贵阶层有利,而对劳工阶层不利。他们的见解在那时候是对的,如今后也是不错的。

注:本文仅供就学交换之用,不意味作者观点。

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